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I. Introduction:  The Case for Asset-Based Transfer Policy 
 
 “The poor are just like the rest of us, except they don’t have as 
much money.”  Harold Watts, 1971 (and others) 
 
The motives that underlie the desire to save and accumulate assets are not very well understood.  
Economic theories about saving (e.g., the “life cycle hypothesis”) are not well borne out by 
empirical evidence.  Rates of saving differ substantially across nations with similar levels of 
economic development (e.g., high in Japan and Germany compared to the United States), 
suggesting that cultural as well as economic factors determine savings. Finally, one influential 
economist argues that the United States is a nation driven by “luxury fever,” which pushes our 
consumption desires beyond our savings capacity (Frank 1999).  In fact, the evidence is that both 
net worth and consumer/household debt have grown in America over the past two decades 
(Wolff 2000). 
 
It should perhaps come as no surprise that public policy toward the poor has changed from one 
of penalizing asset accumulation and saving (via liquid asset tests for “means”-tested programs 
targeted at the poor) to one of encouraging asset building.  There is recent qualitative and 
quantitative evidence that the poor do indeed desire to accumulate assets and to save for specific 
purposes (Edin 1998; Romich and Weisner 1999; Sherraden 1991; Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, 
and Simon 1999; Smeeding, Ross Phillips, and O’Connor 2000; Beverly, Tescher, and Marzahl 
2000).   
 
However, desire and action are often two different realities (Thaler 1990; Shefrin and Thaler 
1992).  Motives, goals, and aspirations of savers, particularly low-income savers, may differ 
from those of policymakers and policy analysts.  Hence, the congruence and interactions of two 
or more sets of policy instruments may be difficult to predict ex ante.  It is with these hesitations 
in mind that we begin.  
 
This paper is about the possibility of linking the savings desires of the low-income population to 
two or more policy instruments:  first, generous federal and state income tax provisions aimed at 
low-income families—The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC); and second, a set of proposed 
policy instruments that subsidize savings behavior for low-income households through the tax 
code and other mechanisms, which we call Universal Savings Accounts-Individual Development 
Accounts (USA/IDAs).  The EITC offers low-income families a clear-cut opportunity to 
accumulate assets and to build positive net worth.  The USA-IDA legislation hopes to build on 
this motivation and to assist financially and logistically to meet these goals. We call this 
interaction “asset-based transfer policy.” 
 
Our study reviews some recent evidence on desired savings among EITC beneficiaries as well as 
some of the difficulties of designing an effective asset-building policy for this population.  We 
first review the EITC and the evidence on savings desires among a sample of more than 800 
recipients surveyed in Chicago in 1998.  Then we delve into the possible rationales for savings 
and some of the new policies for promoting asset accumulation among the poor.  This leads us to 
some suggestions for making a more complete assessment of the design, feasibility, and 
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effectiveness of an asset-based transfer policy for low-income families and its interaction with 
the EITC. 
 
II. The EITC and Asset Accumulation 
 
The largest United States cash income support program for low-income families is the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC).  In 1998, the EITC was expected to cost the federal government 
$30.5 billion according to the Council of Economic Advisers (1998).1  More than 19.7 million 
taxpaying units benefited from the EITC in 1998; roughly 80 percent of total benefits were 
returned to claimants in the form of an IRS tax refund check.  Though state EITCs were not 
studied because Illinois (the sample site) did not have a state EITC program in 1998, at least 11 
states currently have their own Earned Income Credit program (Johnson and Lazere 1999).  
These state-level tax instruments supplement the federal EITC, adding to both the impact and the 
total outlays for the EITC (Greenstein and Shapiro 1998). 
 
Despite its enormity, very little is known about the impact of the EITC on the families who 
receive it.  Unlike other income-transfer programs, the EITC is received by almost all families 
(99 percent of recipients) as an annual, lump-sum, tax refund check paid sometime in the spring 
of the year after earnings are received.  Moreover, the EITC is administered by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) via the personal income tax system, thus permitting eligible clients to 
self-select for benefits without a formal review and certification of eligibility (Liebman 1998a).  
For these reasons, the EITC is likely to have very different effects from a benefit received 
monthly over the year in which the qualifying income is earned, or a benefit administered by the 
social welfare programs.  As a result, the EITC offers an opportunity to observe behavioral 




The EITC was enacted in 1975 to provide refundable tax credits to low-income workers, and 
originally to refund some fraction of their Social Security taxes (Eissa and Hoynes 1999).  It was 
significantly expanded in the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 and the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Acts (OBRA) of 1990 and 1993.  By 1999 a maximum federal refundable tax 
credit of $3,816 was available to low-income households with two children and earned income 
between $9,540 and $12,460.2  Participation rates in the EITC were estimated to be about 85 
percent in 1990 (Scholz 1990, 1994), but may have increased since then as the maximum benefit 
and income ceiling have increased and eligibility standards have been broadened.3  The most 
significant changes in the EITC over the past decade have taken place in benefit generosity to 
families with two children.  The 1993 OBRA expanded the maximum credit for families with 
two children from $1,511 in 1993 to $3,816 in 1999, and higher in subsequent years.  The result 
is a 40 percent earnings subsidy for low-earnings families in 1999 compared to a 19.5 percent 
subsidy in 1993.  The EITC now helps families with two children and incomes of up to $30,585 
compared to $23,050 in 1993.  Because of this growth, the EITC benefits a wide range of 
families, from those who might be cycling on and off welfare (TANF) to those with near median 
incomes.  Faced with this broad range of beneficiaries, we would expect to find different types of 
effects for different types of recipients.  In fact, these differences may be quite important for 
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asset-building policies, as different subgroups of EITC recipients may have very different 
reasons for saving. 
 
Among lower income families, EITC is not counted as TANF income in most states (Meyer and 
Rosenbaum 1998), nor is it counted toward Food Stamps or Medicaid eligibility in the month 
that it is received.4  The EITC therefore offers a powerful work incentive for low-income earners 
with children, e.g., the TANF population.  And low-income earners in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
involved in the New Hope Experiment seem to understand the relationship between work and the 
size of the tax refund as being linear, i.e., “more work, more money” (Romich and Weisner 
1999).  One recent econometric study (Meyer and Rosenbaum 1998) concludes that the EITC 
has been the foremost driving force in explaining increased hours worked by former welfare 
mothers over the 1993-1996 period.  While other TANF changes—the enhancement of earnings 
disregards, sanctions and limits on benefit receipt—and a strong growing economy with low 
unemployment also helped put more welfare mothers to work, there is little doubt that the EITC 
played a large role in reducing the welfare rolls (see also Council of Economic Advisers 1998; 
Blank, Card, and Robbins 1999). 
 
Of course, as with all targeted income supplement programs, what goes up with rising earnings 
(benefits) must at some point decline (phase out).  The federal EITC for families with two or 
more children in 1999 declines at a rate of 21.06 percent per dollar earned from $12,460 to 
$30,580 (Figure 1).  While there have been no studies of the effect of the phase out on single 
earners, Eissa and Hoynes (1999) find that the phase out reduces work effort by married women 
by a noticeable amount.  Thus, higher earning families in the “phase-out” region of the EITC 
respond differently than do lower earnings units in the “phase-in” or “plateau” ranges. 
 
If we count it as “income” in the year that it accrues, the EITC also has a powerful anti-poverty 
effect, reducing child poverty by 2.4 million in 1996, or a one-seventh reduction in poor 
children.  It is the largest single program removing children from poverty (Greenstein and 
Shapiro 1998).  According to the Census Bureau, the EITC removed 4.3 million persons of all 
ages from poverty in 1997, more than double the 1993 amount (Council of Economic Advisers 
1998).  Among the working poor, some 30 percent of children who would otherwise be poor 
(based on earnings and other sources of income) were lifted from poverty by the EITC.  And by 
itself, the EITC offsets between one-fourth and one-third of the declining share of national 
income received by the poorest fifth of all households with children from 1976 to 1996 (Liebman 
1998). 
 
In sum, recent studies have shown that the EITC increases work effort of low-income families by 
supplementing earnings, thus raising net incomes and reducing poverty.  But these studies treat 
the EITC as an income subsidy and for the most part ignore its delivery mechanism and its effect 
on savings. 
 
Economic and Behavioral Effects5 
 
Because of its unique administration and “lumpy” character, the EITC offers a rare opportunity 
to examine the direct economic impact of the program on recipients.6  The lumpy nature of the 
EITC arises from several forces.  First of all the EITC can be taken as a transfer during the year.  
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If employees fill in a W-5 withholding form submit it to their employers they can receive up to 
60 percent of the maximum allowable amount of the EITC scaled to their monthly or weekly 
checks.  The maximum amount of refunds in 1998 was $26 per week (O’Connor 1999a).  
However, 99 percent of recipients do not use this option, and instead receive a lump sum amount 
when they file their income tax in the following year (Scholz 1994).  There are several possible 
explanations for such behavior, including: (a) employers’ unwillingness to participate in the 
program; (b) employees’ unwillingness to inform the employer due to stigma effects or fears of 
lower pre-tax wages; and finally, (c) employees’ desire for the forced savings aspects of the 
EITC.  There is some evidence that recipients prefer the forced savings aspects of the EITC 
(Romich and Weisner 1999; Olson and Davis 1994).  However, the relative impacts of these 
factors, and perhaps others, have yet to be examined, and our study sheds little or no light on the 
question of why clients receive EITC benefits in the current form. 
 
Regardless of the reason for type of benefit receipt, the lumpy nature of the EITC benefit and its 
recent rapid increases in benefit generosity create a rare and different opportunity to study the 
effects of the program on household finances—both on expenditure patterns and on asset 
behavior (i.e., debt, credit, and savings).7  In fact, before the recent papers by Smeeding, Ross, 
O’Connor, and Simon (1999), Smeeding, Ross Phillips, and O’Connor (2000), and Beverly, 
Tescher, and Marzahl (2000), very little had been written on the effects of the EITC on 
household financial behavior or how households use EITC benefits, despite the fact that benefits 
received can be as high as 50 percent of the previous year’s income, for example, in states with 
high state supplements (DeParle 1999). 
 
Small studies (200- to 300-person telephone interviews) have shown that the EITC is used to pay 
overdue utility bills (e.g., Gallup Poll 1993), but not much else has been written on this topic.  
One important New York Times news story (Rimer 1995) suggested that some recipients made 
interesting and creative use of the EITC to improve transportation to and from a job, to move to a 
safer neighborhood, or to put children into better schools.  However, the extent to which these 
uses are typical or idiosyncratic was not examined by Rimer.  A recent ethnographic study of 42 
low-income families in Wisconsin examines the use of tax refunds (Romich and Weisner 1999).8  
The authors conclude that families use lump-sum tax refunds to improve family well-being and 
to make large purchases.  Throughout the year, low-income families in the Romich and Weisner 
study seem to alter their market and nonmarket labor supply in order to help smooth the flow of 
economic resources.  Souleles (1999) studied the response of households to income tax refunds 
more generally and concluded that roughly 20 percent of tax refunds were used for purchases of 
durable goods. 
 
Chicago Study of EITC Usage 
 
The data in Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, and Simon (1999) were drawn from a sample of 7,000 
low-income Chicago area taxpayers who utilized the free tax preparation services provided by 
the Center for Law and Human Services (CLHS) in the winter and spring of 1998.  The CLHS 
has ten centers in the Chicago metropolitan area in which any low-income taxpayer can receive 
free assistance from professionally qualified volunteers in preparing their tax return. From 
January through April 1998 we interviewed low-income taxpayers in general, and EITC 
beneficiaries in particular, at these sites.  More than 90 percent of taxpayers interviewed were 
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willing to discuss their refunds.  This produced a sample of 826 tax returns which CLHS 
calculated would generate both a federal tax refund and the EITC as part of that refund.  About 
one-quarter (208) of these families also completed a follow-up phone interview six weeks after 
filing to verify their receipt of the EITC and to answer again the same questions posed to them 
earlier on their use of the EITC.9 
 
Uses of the EITC 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine two important types of usage for the EITC:  (a) making 
ends meet and (b) improving social mobility.  Respondents were given several categories of 
future purchases: for goods or services, for paying off existing bills, or for saving the refund for 
future anticipated or unanticipated needs.  While several other bundles of categories of uses 
could be created, we initially selected these two particular categories. 
 
First of all, the EITC is targeted on low-income working families with children; more than one-
half of those in our sample received one or more means-tested transfers in 1997-98.  Our data 
suggest that our sample head of household population is largely made up of former welfare 
mothers who in 1998 found formal jobs, or increased hours worked at existing jobs and are, in 
effect, trying to make ends meet.  These mothers, most of whom were much less attached to the 
labor force in earlier times, may have unmet consumption needs or may use the EITC mainly to 
spread their consumption over the year.  
 
Recent studies show that typical household expenses make up over 100 percent of welfare 
clients’ incomes, the rest being made up from borrowing or from unreported earnings (Edin and 
Lein 1997).  Among these types of households, Edin and Lein have shown that the move from 
informal unreported work to formal work adds to expenses (e.g., child care, transportation), 
which reduces or negates the positive impact of higher earned income and may leave the 
household in no better economic circumstances than when they were on welfare.  More recently, 
Loprest (1999) reports similar findings.  Among welfare mothers, Edin (1998) found that living 
day-to-day (or month-to-month) was the typical way of life and that formal asset-building, 
saving, or even formal contact with financial institutions (e.g., banks or use of credit cards) was a 
rare event.  Despite their poor economic circumstances, Edin found that many interviewees were 
aware of and interested in accumulating assets or using earned income to improve their social 
mobility (Edin 1998).  Yet the majority were struggling just to make ends meet (see also Loprest 
1999).  Among such types of potential recipients, the EITC could be seen as a way to buy 
durables, pay off outstanding bills, and meet other urgent consumption needs.  To the extent that 
the EITC helps meet current consumption needs, it may be no different than other types of 
income subsidies, child care subsidies, and similar benefits (e.g., Food Stamps) in terms of its 
impact on recipients. 
 
While the majority of Edin’s sample were credit constrained and had little leverage to borrow 
money, many still expressed a strong interest in having access to credit and accumulating savings 
for durable purchases (Edin 1998).  Many of them, however, also realized that saving EITC 
benefits in formal settings such as bank accounts would negatively affect their eligibility for 
welfare benefits.  Hence, low-income workers tend to avoid banks.  Because of these and other 
cultural factors, many low-income families may be “credit constrained” in that they either lack 
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access to formal credit markets or, having access, they are not credit-worthy enough to obtain a 
bank loan.  For populations similar to these, and in particular among those who are struggling to 
move from welfare to something better, the EITC and its lumpiness presents an opportunity to 
make extraordinary types of purchases that they might not otherwise be able to make, or to save 
for “big ticket” items such as homes, cars, or college. 
 
The literature on assets and the poor (e.g., Sherraden 1991; Bird, Hagstrom, and Wild 1999; Edin 
1998; Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Shapiro 1998) suggests that even low-income families are 
willing to make sacrifices by postponing current consumption to improve their long-run 
economic well-being when presented with appropriate incentives and opportunities to save.  
Because of its large size relative to current income, the EITC presents an opportunity for 
otherwise credit constrained low-income families to move beyond current consumption and to 
use the EITC for asset building purposes.  Shapiro (1998) refers to this as “asset building” or 
“improving social mobility.” This term was used to describe several types of asset-enhancing 
uses of the EITC for improving longer term economic mobility and well-being.  Many of these 
uses are consistent with both Edin’s (1998) findings and with those found by Rimer (1995)and 
Romich and Weisner (1999) in their more limited set of interviews, and since verified by 
Beverly, Tescher, and Marzahl (2000). 
 
Moving and Housing.     For instance, recent studies indicate that significant numbers of low-
income central city residents would move to safer neighborhoods if they could afford to do so 
(e.g., Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield 1998).  Recent studies based on the Moving to 
Opportunity (MTO) experiment verify that low-income central city residents who participate in 
MTO overwhelmingly (70 to 75 percent of movers) choose to move away from violence and 
crime when given the chance (Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield 1998).  Chicago has a number of 
dangerous inner city neighborhoods, including those in which we sampled our interviewees (e.g., 
Sampson, Randenbusch, and Earls 1997).  Because moving a household requires both direct 
moving expenses and demonstrates ability to pay rent (e.g., first and last months rent), the EITC 
might provide such an opportunity.  Alternatively, residents who have a growing stake in their 
neighborhood could use the EITC to repair or improve their home.  In fact, 6 percent of our 
sample were homeowners who were paying off mortgages, and many of them claimed this as a 
priority use of the EITC.  Finally, the desire to own their own home may have an important 
longer-term effect on asset accumulation among EITC clients. 
 
Automobiles and Transportation.     Increasingly, studies of welfare to work are finding that 
owning or having access to a reliable means of transportation is a key to reducing the time costs 
of work-related travel, and thus enabling a job seeker to expand the area of job search to obtain 
higher wages and improve economic well-being.  The EITC also provides an opportunity to 
purchase, upgrade, or repair a car, or to make a downpayment on a better car, or to pay for car 
insurance.  Since lack of transportation is a serious impediment to job search, employment, and 
job mobility, the EITC may provide a critical bridge to a higher level of economic well-being via 
a dependable source of transportation (Ong 1996).  Danziger et al. (2000) find that 47 percent of 
their sample of low-income welfare recipients do not own or have access to a car, but for those 
who do, the marginal effects of car ownership on earnings are equivalent to the marginal effects 
of completing high school in terms of higher future earnings.  Edin (1998) also reports that her 
sample of fathers could use cars to begin self-employment as informal taxi drivers, as pickup and 
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delivery agents, or as “junkers.”10  Hence, an opportunity to purchase a car or a truck, insure a 
car, repair a car, or pay off a car loan increases the opportunity to work more and at better paying 
jobs.   
 
Human Capital.     The EITC also presents a source of funds for human capital investment both 
for tuition and as an alternative to student loans or to pay off former student loans, either for the 
recipient or their children.11  In effect, a $1,000 to $2,000 EITC is a good substitute for a tuition 
voucher to a parochial or private school in communities where public schools are inadequate.  
Recipients can also use EITC benefits to improve their children’s early learning by improving 
the quality of their child care or for other for child-related learning enhancing expenses.  The 
EITC can also pay the recipient’s tuition at a local community college or trade school. 
 
Saving.     Another important use of the EITC which improves social mobility is saving for 
specified purposes (Thaler 1990).  Movement from welfare or government safety nets to self-
protection via own precautionary savings is an important indicator of upward social mobility.  
Making regular car payments and paying off bank loans, medical bills, or credit card bills are all 
uses of EITC that help establish or improve a credit history.  Repaying informal loans or sharing 
EITC refunds with family members is also indicative of social capital building and maintenance 
of nongovernmental means of support in case of emergencies.  In fact, a growing number of 
American policymakers feel that saving is a worthy activity that should be subsidized for low-
income Americans in the same way that tax deductions for IRAs, 401(k)s, and pensions 
subsidize saving for others (Boshara 1999; Seidman 1999).  If the EITC effectively subsidizes 
saving as well as work, it has a double benefit for society, as we investigate more fully below. 
 
Classifications of Bundles.     Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, and Simon (1999) separated their 
EITC categories of use into two corresponding “bundles.”  In their sample, payment of regular 
bills (rent, utilities, food, groceries, clothing, personal expenses), and purchases of clothing were 
classified as expenses for making ends meet.  So were purchases of household appliances or 
household furniture, as well as other personal or regular household expenses. 
 
Using the EITC to improve social mobility included all forms of debt repayment, savings, and 
other expenditures that were easily identified as increasing chances for improved mobility, 
including all forms of work-related expenses.  These included payment of credit card, 
automobile, or personal debt.  They also included human capital building (e.g., tuition payments, 
medical bills), expenses for cars (purchases, repairs, insurance), moving expenses, and home 
improvements.  Sharing money with family members was also classified as an equity expense in 




Here we review the results of the Chicago study with a particular eye toward asset accumulation 
and desired savings behavior.  A more complete set of results is found in Smeeding, Ross, 
O’Connor, and Simon (1999), and for families with children only in Smeeding, Ross Phillips, 
and O’Connor (2000). 
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Priorities.     First, respondents were asked to list up to three priority uses of the EITC benefit.  
Of the 826 respondents, 617 or 74.7 percent had at least one top priority use for the EITC, while 
40 percent also had a second priority and 12 percent a third priority use as well.  These priorities 
are summarized in Figure 1.  They indicate that bill paying was the single highest priority use of 
the EITC for almost one-half of all beneficiaries, with purchases coming in second across all 
priority levels.  Across all three priority levels, between 75 and 80 percent of respondents would 
use the EITC to pay a bill or make a purchase of some commodity.  Clearly the EITC helps make 
ends meet; this result was fully expected.   
 
However, almost one-half of all respondents (49 percent) also stated that they would save some 
or all of their EITC check.12  Purposes for saving were mixed.  Less than 40 percent claimed they 
were saving to pay off current or future bills, while more than 80 percent were saving for at least 
one equity building purpose such as purchasing a car, home, or education for themselves or their 
children.  Beverly, Tescher, and Marzahl (2000) have similar findings, with only 21 percent of 
their EITC savings plan participants stating that precautionary savings were their first priority 
use for savings. 
 
Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, and Simon (1999) identified three key uses of the EITC that 
enhance social mobility:  moving, paying tuition, or purchasing or repairing a car.  Each of these 
uses is also summarized in Figure 1.  While moving seems to be an all-or-nothing decision (with 
only 3 percent listing it as a secondary or tertiary preference compared to 4 percent who list it as 
a primary preference), paying tuition or purchasing/repairing a car are more evenly spread across 
the preference scale.  Altogether, 16 percent of the sample stated they would use the EITC to pay 
tuition while 22 percent would make a car-related use of the refund.  These uses suggest that the 
EITC also plays a large role in improving social mobility, a finding that the authors did not 
expect.  All other priority uses of the EITC are summarized in the final columns and amount to 
only 11 percent of primary priorities and 14 percent of secondary priorities.  The separately 
identified categories, upon which we focus below, seem to be driving the results.  
 
Specific Uses.     Combining priority uses across all respondents so that all persons stating each 
use (i.e., as a first, second, or third priority) are represented and bundling them as suggested in 
the previous section of the paper, Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, and Simon (1999) arrived at the 
best overall snapshot of EITC use (Table 1).  Several important patterns are evident in this table. 
 
• More than one-half of all beneficiaries had a social mobility related use for the EITC.  
This use increased with income and benefit level, peaking for those with the maximum 
benefit (Panel B).  Moving, transportation, and saving all peaked in the plateau range and 
declined slightly in the phase out range.  Tuition expenses increased slightly as incomes rose. 
• Making ends meet was an important use of the EITC for almost one-half of the sample 
(Panel C).  Utilities and rent were higher priorities than were food and clothes. 
• As expected, the lowest income households in the phase-in range had higher immediate 
needs than did those in the phase-out range.  Utilities and rent dominated food and clothes 
as consumption needs for this group. 
• Less than 20 percent of the sample had no plans for the EITC, with those in the phase-in 
range most likely to not state a use (Panel D).  Both this data and anecdotal evidence 
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(DeParle 1999) suggests that these were likely to be lower income persons who did not 
expect a refund to begin with. 
• If we were to prioritize usage according to our designated bundles of uses, we find that while 
those who would make both types of use are evenly spread across the range of refunds at 21 
to 23 percent of respondents, about one-third would make social mobility uses only while 
one-quarter would use the EITC check only to make ends meet.  Both bundles follow 
predictable patterns across the EITC range, with those in the phase-in region having making 
ends meet as the highest priority while those at the plateau or in the phase-out ranges placing 
a higher priority on uses that improve longer run social mobility. 
 
Thus, there are some suggestions that the determinants of EITC usage vary in predictable ways.  
 
Access to Credit.      If we are to study savings behavior among EITC beneficiaries, it is 
important to understand how EITC recipients relate to financial institutions.  The ability to safely 
protect assets until they are needed seems important to long-term mobility.  Low-income 
respondents who use check cashing services and who have no formal relationship to financial 
markets, i.e., no checking or savings accounts, and no credit cards, loans, or mortgages, are less 
likely to be able to keep a large EITC refund intact for future needs.  In general, they will be less 
likely to benefit from federal asset-building policies. 
 
In fact, access to financial and credit markets differs markedly across the income ranges of 
beneficiaries in the Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, and Simon (1999) study (see Table 2).  Only 40 
percent of those in the phase-in range had one or more of the types of financial affiliations listed 
above.  Only 24 percent had a checking account.  In contrast, almost 73 percent of those in the 
phase-out region had some contact with financial markets.  Checking and savings accounts, 
credit card usage, and bank loans all increase across the EITC range.  In contrast, use of a check 
cashing service declined steadily across the income ranges, with 57.8 percent of those in the 
phase-in range using such services, and 44.3 percent of the plateau group.  Many of our 
respondents did, however, indicate that they wanted to open a checking or savings account with 
their EITC check once it was received.13  Preliminary comparisons indicate that these 
breakdowns are similar to those found by other researchers using national samples to investigate 
use of credit cards and checking and savings accounts among low-income populations (e.g., 
Bird, Hagstrom, and Wild 1999; Carney and Gale 1999).  Caskey (2000) and Hogarth and Lee 
(2000) report that approximately ten million households nationwide are “unbanked,” largely 
minority renters with no savings, and with younger household heads.  Clearly, bringing banking 
services to this population, many of whom receive the EITC, will be a crucial future task for 




Altogether, the findings of Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, and Simon (1999) suggest that 
knowledge of EITC is high, that the large majority of people who receive the EITC expect it, and 
that most of those people have at least one use related to building social mobility for the EITC.  
Yet many recipients have little or no formal ties to financial markets and many rely on informal 
services to cash their refund checks.  Thus, while the EITC offers some hope as a vehicle for tax-
financed asset accumulation policy, we have not yet achieved that goal.  And, as others have 
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suggested, additional subsidies for tax-funded savings, which EITC participants favor, are liable 
to be needed. 
 
This study was the initial exploration of the ways in which families used our largest targeted 
income transfer program, the EITC.  As far as we know, it is the only such study to date, though 
others have urged similar studies (e.g., Hotz and Scholz 2000).  The EITC is unique because of 
both its tax administered nature and because of its “lumpiness” and once a year nature.  This 
lumpiness may provide a key vehicle to overcome a short-term liquidity crisis and to provide 
recipients with opportunities to move beyond support of current consumption to meet more 
strategic longer term goals.  It may also provide a vehicle for asset-building policies.  While debt 
payment and consumption spreading behavior was to be expected, more than one-half of EITC 
recipients used their refunds to improve their social mobility.  The large majority of EITC 
recipients were aware of the program and were able to articulate several specific uses for their 
refund, including investments in higher current and future earnings such as schooling, 
transportation, and moving.  
 
Savings Policy Implications 
 
If we wish to encourage social mobility uses for the EITC, Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, and 
Simon (1999) found that they were positively related to having formal contact with financial 
institutions.  As the federal government increasingly moves toward electronic benefit transfer 
(EBT) over the next several years, both formal relations with banks and the financial literacy that 
is required should be encouraged by policymakers (Stegman 1999).  Opening a checking account 
offers a safe means of storing the EITC until priority uses can be sorted out.  In turn, checking 
and savings accounts offer the possibility for having both precautionary savings and for longer 
term asset building.  Public policies that permit or encourage asset accumulation for low-income 
households are obviously important here and could further strengthen ties with formal financial 
institutions.   
 
Legislation to create special subsidized savings accounts for special purposes such as home 
ownership, post-secondary tuition, or retirement have recently appeared on the policy agenda 
(Boshara 1999).  Universal Savings Accounts (USAs) and Individual Development Accounts 
(IDAs) are currently in the experimental stage.  If we believe that asset accumulation is an 
important part of upward social mobility, only those with formal ties to financial intermediaries 
will be able to take advantage of these efforts.  It may be useful in some cases to offer outright 
subsidies to EITC beneficiaries to open savings accounts for specified purposes (e.g., Seidman 
1999), thus providing an incentive to open a bank account and to save for a specific goal. 
 
The EITC helps meet current consumption needs but also offers avenues for upward social 
mobility.  The findings of the Chicago study suggest that increased incentives for savings, 
greater access to credit markets, and federal programs to match low-income savings for specified 
purposes (e.g., home purchases or schooling) could lead to greater savings and work effort by the 
low-income, low-wage population, and hence to greater levels of self-insurance and self-
sufficiency.  The importance of the EITC for promoting savings-based policy cannot be 
understated.  Without the EITC, almost one-half of its recipients could not have met their first 
priority use for the EITC, while the large majority of the rest could meet their primary need only 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
10
to a lesser extent or with some delay.  Hence, the EITC provides an important source of support 
for working poor families.  As such, the EITC appears to be our most effective federal program 
for leading low-income families on a path toward true economic independence.  The question we 
must further investigate is how the EITC interacts with other recent legislative actions, existing 
programs, and new proposals to promote asset accumulation among low-income populations. 
 
III. Linking the EITC and Savings:  Promises and Pitfalls 
 
Can the EITC and USA/IDAs interact to provide a significant, combined effect on the asset 
position of low-income households?  The first (and last) thing to be said is that if the EITC is 
good policy, and USA/IDAs are good policy, then the two should co-exist in any case.  The 
interaction among the two is bound to be positive, even if small.  It is not clear that USA/IDA 
policy should be tied at all to the EITC.  However, if the USA/IDA design can help EITC 
recipients meet their needs while also achieving its goals, the combined effect might be large, 
and the two together might make for better policy.  The problem we face is that at this time we 
can only speculate about this interaction.  
 
First, realize that asset accumulation policy for low-income families is liable to be a more 
complicated venture than one might believe (Shefrin and Thaler 1992; Thaler 1990).  For 
instance, Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, and Simon (1999) also found that about one-quarter of 
their sample have credit cards and of these, 80 percent had credit card debt averaging about 
$2,400.  Yet only 18 percent of these respondents listed paying off credit card debt as a priority 
use for the EITC refund they received.  Clearly, promotion of  financial literacy is another 
consideration for asset accumulation policy. 
 
Hotz and Scholz (2000) suggest that further research of this type in a dynamic context if sorely 
needed.  Most families who receive the EITC in one year receive it in the next.  Indeed, more 
than one-third of the Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, and Simon (1999) sample stated that they 
received the EITC last year.  The dynamics of the EITC may therefore help families to move to 
economic independence.  Of course, changes in employment, marriage and cohabitation, divorce 
or separation, family living arrangements, and various other factors could also affect transition.  
Following a sample of recipients over time would shed additional light on these topics and more 
clearly identify the pathways from dependency on means-tested transfers to economic 
independence, the use of savings, and the potential for the EITC as a basis for asset-building 





Clearly there is potential for the EITC to be linked to asset-building policy (Seidman 1999; 
Beverly, Tescher, and Marzahl 2000).  President Clinton has proposed legislation to further 
expand the federal EITC with an even larger benefit for families of three or more.  The list of 
states offering some added EITC benefit is growing, with even Illinois now beginning such a 
policy.  Cherry and Sawicky (2000) propose combining the EITC with refundable child tax 
credits, thus further strengthening the structure of tax credits for low-income households and 
removing some of the labor supply disincentives in the current program.  Moreover, there has 
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been no increase in the fraction of households selecting the early payment option for the EITC, 
suggesting that lump-sum transfers at a fixed time will grow even larger in future years.  Hence, 
the possibility for linking the EITC to savings-based policy is ever increasing. 
 
What are the savings goals of low-income households?  For the low-income population in the 
peak EITC benefit ranges of roughly $9,500 to 12,500, it seems that the desire to become 
economically independent, to avoid returning to welfare, to accumulate human capital via more 
and better education for their children and themselves, and to accumulate durables (including 
cars and homeownership) are the primary goals. 
 
The recent proposals for subsidized savings accounts and other asset-based policies clearly 
intend to build assets among the poor. The tax code is used to subsidize savings and asset 
accumulation for high-income households; why not for low-income units as well?  As mentioned 
earlier, these proposals come in two basic varieties: savings for retirement, e.g., President 
Clinton’s Universal Savings Accounts (USAs); and Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), 
which subsidize savings for other purposes.  We cannot be sure of the success of such policies 
because no one has attempted to carry out such an asset-building policy on a large scale.  And 
while the EITC evidence in the Chicago Study, as well as the Beverly, Tescher, and Marzahl 
(2000) study, suggests that low-income families have the desire to save, one must question how 




First we need to better understand the motives for saving among the poor and their linkage with 
legislated purposes for saving via USA/IDAs.  The EITC population is largely a low-income 
group.  According to IRS data for 1996, of the 19.5 million filers who claimed the EITC, 7.8 
million claimed one child while 8.0 million claimed two or more children (Internal Revenue 
Service 1999).  Over 97 percent of the total cost of the credit for tax year 1996 ($28.2 billion) 
went to the 82 percent of the filers who claimed one or more eligible children (Internal Revenue 
Service 1999).  National samples from 1997 also divide EITC beneficiaries into two major 
groups: (a) about 70 percent are single parents filing as heads of households, or single persons; 
(b) almost 30 percent are low earning two-parent households (U.S. Congress 1998, Table 13-13, 
p. 871).  Other IRS data suggest that 18 percent of filers in 1996 were single filers without 
children (Internal Revenue Service 1999).  Assuming the same fraction of single filers in 1997 as 
in 1996, this means that 52 percent of national filers were single-parent heads of households in 
1997.  In contrast, almost one-half of all recipients are in the phase-out range (above $12,400 in 
1999), with most of these in two-parent households. 
 
Hence, the largest EITC credits go to young families with children, most of them single parents.  
In the income ranges where the EITC is the highest ($12,000-$15,000 annual gross earned 
income per year) families are more likely to be struggling to escape poverty than to achieve 
secure middle class status.  At higher income ranges, the EITC subsidy quickly shrinks both as 
the program phases (at 21 percent) and as federal income tax liability grows (at 15 percent).  
Thus, most recipients of the EITC in the $20,000-$25,000 income and above range receive either 
small tax refunds, or pay lower taxes and receive no April tax filing bonus.  While this group is 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
12
more likely to participate in a USA/IDA plan, their impetus from the EITC refund is liable to be 
small. 
 
Therefore, it seems that the families most able to finance long-term savings do not get a large 
EITC bonus.  At the same time, those closest to welfare and those with the least stable familial 
situations (low-income, single parents) are liable to receive the greatest EITC bonuses.  Thus, 
much of the attraction of using the EITC has to be contrasted to the savings intentions of truly 
low-income mothers with young children who receive the bulk of large EITC payments. 
 
Designing USA/IDAs for EITC Beneficiaries.     If EITC-linked savings policies are aimed at 
lower income households because of the EITC structure, we must therefore ask what drives their 
savings intentions.  While there are few studies of these motives, there is some evidence of the 
desires of EITC recipients for different types of savings (Beverly, Tescher, and Marzahl 2000; 
Beverly and Sherraden 1999; Hogarth and O’Donnell 1999).  Clearly, low-income households 
have a desire for precautionary savings.  Short-term liquidity is important for expected and 
unexpected future bills, particularly for those just leaving welfare.  Further, low-income 
households save for specific goals: a first or better car; a first home; and to start a business (see 
also Davis and Lemieux 2000).  Many also save to pay for their education or that of their 
children.  Finally, after all of these priorities are met, low-income families may choose to save 
for retirement. 
 
It seems that this list of savings priorities is both judicious and sensible, especially for single 
parents.  But if so, few large EITC beneficiaries will save for retirement.  Thus while EITC-
based savings incentives may be useful for some type of savings plans such as IDAs, they are 
liable to be less useful as vehicles for add-on retirement savings accounts such as USAs.  Not 
only do savings needs differ among those with and without children, but once children have 
grown to age 18 and retirement savings became a priority, the maximum value of the EITC drops 
precipitously.  Vice President Gore seems to recognize this dilemma, since his “retirement 
savings plan” (with tax credits to match client savings up to a 3-to-1 ratio) would allow for 
withdrawals for college tuition, a first home, or catastrophic medical expenses as well as for 
retirement.  This is not to say that matched pension accounts are not a good idea (as 
demonstrated by Orszag and Greenstein 2000), but that retirement savings accounts do not seem 
to match well with the savings needs of EITC recipients who receive large lump-sum amounts. 
Finally, plans that tie up personal savings for specified periods in order to receive subsidies 
vitiate the use of these savings for short-term needs.  While a large fraction of EITC recipients 
may be enticed to participate in an IDA-type scheme, the time and use limitations may clash with 
their short-term needs for emergency bill paying or durables purchases due to job loss, car 
breakdown, or related costly “emergencies.”  There is a long literature on low-income women’s 
tendencies to cycle on and off welfare, and the immediate use of savings may be to avoid cycling 
back to welfare.  However, subsidized IDAs are not designed for such uses.  Perhaps the 
Beverly, Tescher, and Marzahl (2000) study can help us to better understand if EITC recipients 
can maintain their IDA-like accounts throughout the current year. 
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IV. Making Policy:  Linkages between Low-Income Families and  
Asset-Building Policies 
 
Low-income families need and want to build assets.  Financial institutions offer a safe place to 
keep assets and to monitor their growth.  They also provide an institution for maintaining the 
fidelity and public accountability demand required of an IDA/USA type program.  Linkages to 
the EITC may provide both an opportunity and a natural linkage to savings.  Indeed, EITC 
recipients might well find that financial institutions, which offer safety features, and public 
programs that subsidize asset accumulation (with a large match for participation) offer an 
attractive use for part of their EITC refund.  However, such schemes are liable to be complex 
conceptually, personally, and administratively.  In this section of the paper we close by 





Before we even begin to encourage savings by the poor, we need to stop discouraging asset 
accumulation in “means”-tested benefit programs.  The recent literature finds strong evidence 
that social insurance in general, and means-tested programs in particular, discourage savings 
(e.g., Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995; Gruber and Yelowitz 1997; Powers 1998; Neumark 
and Powers 1998).  The fact that so few lower-income clients have checking or savings accounts 
could be because the asset tests associated with welfare receipt and/or Medicaid receipt 
discourage saving or opening bank accounts.  In most states the EITC is not counted toward 
TANF for benefit determination; however, it is counted toward asset limits after two months for 
Medicaid and SSI.  While many states have eased liquid asset tests for TANF clients, Food 
Stamp asset limits for most families remain relatively low, thereby penalizing savers who fear 
losing their jobs and having to reapply for aid.  Low limits on the maximum value of a car 
($5,000) in Food Stamps are liable to have similar effects on eligibility, even when the literature 
clearly suggests that automobile ownership is a key positive determinant of earnings levels.  
However, while Food Stamp asset limits are relatively low, the EITC is exempt from counting 
against Food Stamp asset limits for 12 months after receipt, a much longer period than in the 
cases of SSI or Medicaid.  The negative effects of participation in means-tested programs on 
savings and equity building deserve further investigation.   
 
Ill-conceived policies to limit eligibility to clients whose automobiles are worth less than $4,650 
should be re-evaluated in Food Stamps, while at the same time Medicaid, SSI, and TANF might 
mimic Food Stamps by exempting the EITC from asset tests for 12 months instead of two.  The 
passage of the 2000 Hunger Relief Act would eliminate the federal limits on car value for Food 
Stamps and allow states to set their own value limits on an automobile.  While this would be a 
step in the right direction, a better thing would be to either eliminate the limits entirely or to set 
them at much higher levels (e.g., $12,000 or above).   
 
While many USA/IDA-type savings accounts are explicitly excluded from consideration by 
these programs, it seems wise to change the program rules themselves if we are to build assets 
more generally, and to promote long-term economic independence.  Asset transfers should be 
seen as a way to transform societies, not for meeting emerging needs.  Raising asset limits in 
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“means”-tested programs would allow households the opportunity to build flexible unsubsidized 





The widespread usage of expensive check-cashing outlets; the popularity of short-term loans 
from tax refund vendors (e.g., H&R Block) at 200 percent interest rates; and the persistence of 
credit card borrowing at 19 to 25 percent interest rates, while at the same time “saving” at 1 to 2 
percent interest in bank checking and savings accounts, all suggest that the need for financial 
literacy among low-income households in general and EITC beneficiaries in particular is great.  
While a few pilot programs have begun to educate the welfare-to-work population on financial 
literacy, a longer term and more general education policy is needed.  Financial literacy is a good 
investment in the type of forward-looking society that would adopt tax-based savings incentives 




One must also question the willingness and cost to financial institutions for maintaining and 
monitoring USA/IDA and EITC schemes.  From a financial perspective, these accounts are liable 
to be high cost and low revenue, particularly if banks are required to enforce withdrawal policies 
for specific purposes.  While long-term saving arrangements at fairly low rates of interest offer 
banks a chance to benefit from time-tied savings plans like IDAs and USAs, the costs of 
administering these accounts is high because of their relatively small size and because of the 
chance of early withdrawal.  Davis and Lemieux (2000) report that the average savings of 
participants on the American Dream (IDA) Demonstration Project was $286, and the average 
total account balance (with subsidies) was $845.  Many participants also make in-person monthly 
deposits and withdrawals, consistent with the Beverly, Tescher, and Marzahl (2000) study.  
Hence, these are fairly high maintenance accounts. 
 
Moreover, if USA/IDA withdrawal policies are to be enforced, banks must monitor use of 
withdrawals and obtain “proof” of legitimate usage of funds.  Despite the impending onset of 
Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT), the for-profit banking community in particular, and even 
more low-income friendly credit unions and community-oriented banks, will incur real costs in 
administering USA/IDA plans and in bringing the “unbanked” into the financial world.  These 




The evidence presented here suggests both motive and desire for low-income families to save.  
The EITC and its lump-sum nature offers a natural opportunity for beneficiaries to use part of 
their refunds for targeted asset building.  However, a number of important questions need be 
addressed before we can determine if this marriage of policies between the EITC and IDA/USAs 
is indeed a heavenly one.  In particular, further consideration of the design of USA/IDA-type 
asset accumulation policies to be congruent with the savings desires of low-income beneficiaries, 
particularly those who benefit from the EITC, seems a good next step.  The potential is there, but 
the case is not yet strong for such a linkage.
Center for Social Development 
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Table 1.    Important Uses of the Refund within EITC Range 
 







A Households receiving EITC 46.0 15.5 38.5 100.0 
      
Any Improving Social Mobility Use 46.1 65.6 59.8 54.4 
     Move 3.7 10.2 3.5 4.6 
     Car/transportation 10.8 24.2 13.8 14.0 
     Save 22.4 34.4 32.1 28.0 
B 
     Tuition/school 7.1 10.9 11.3 9.3 
      
Any Making Ends Meet Use 50.8 46.1 45.9 48.2 
     Utilities 32.9 37.5 31.1 32.9 
     Rent 29.5 32.0 30.2 30.1 
     Food 16.6 15.6 21.7 18.4 
C 
     Clothes 22.1 14.8 17.6 19.3 
      
Plans for EITC     
     None 24.2 10.2 17.6 19.5 
     Improving social mobility only 25.0 43.8 36.5 32.3 
     Making ends meet only 29.7 24.2 22.6 26.2 
D 
     Both 21.1 21.9 23.3 22.0 
      
 Total N 380 128 318 826 





Table 2.    Access to Financial and Credit Markets by EITC Range 
 
Percent of Respondents within EITC Range Assets and Formal 
Credit Phase-In Plateau Phase-Out Overall 
 A.  Percent with Different Forms 
Checking account 24.0 36.7 49.7 35.8 
Savings account 16.1 28.9 42.1 28.1 
Credit card 16.6 27.4 37.7 26.4 
Bank loan 1.8 2.3 5.0 3.2 
Mortgage 3.7 2.3 10.1 5.9 
Any of the above 40.0 59.4 72.6 55.6 
     
 B.  Percent Using a Check Cashing Service for Their EITC 
 57.8 44.3 34.2 44.3 
Source:  Smeeding, Ross, and O’Connor (1999). 
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1. Food Stamps, TANF, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) were all budgetarily 
smaller programs in terms of total costs for 1998. 
2. The EITC is also available to single persons but at a much lower level.  In contrast to the 
treatment of families with children, the level of EITC benefit for single filers has not 
changed in real terms since 1994. 
3. While higher benefits and word-of-mouth might have increased participation in the EITC 
since 1990, other factors work in the opposite direction.  In 1991, the IRS began requiring 
a new form, Schedule EIC, in order to claim EITC.  Previously, the IRS would calculate 
and issue the credit based on information in the form 1040.  The participation rate might 
therefore have dropped somewhat in the early 1990s.  Our interviews showed that over 
20 percent of EITC recipients were not expecting a refund.  Many of these individuals 
would not have filed at all but for the CLHS tax program and others like it.  See 
O’Connor (1999) for a more detailed analysis. 
4. However, after two months, any savings from the EITC are counted toward liquid asset 
tests in TANF, SSI, and Medicaid.  EITC does not count against Food Stamp asset limits 
for 12 months (U.S. Congress 1998).  This point is discussed later in the paper. 
5 . The remainder of this section of the paper is based on Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, and 
Simon (1999). 
6.  Liebman (1998a) studies the issue of compliance to the EITC and focuses on 
administrative issues.  He finds increased compliance with EITC rules and regulations 
due to IRS rule changes and audits of returns in the 1990s.  We do not deal with these 
topics below. 
7. Ideally, one would like to separate the economic effects of the EITC using a 
counterfactual group to parse out behavioral affects with a comparison group of some 
type.  Because the EITC is a national program open to all low-income, low-wage 
taxpayers, there is no natural control group.  One could examine year-to-year changes in 
outlays using, for instance, the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), e.g., Barrow and 
McGranahan (2000).  However, the CEX does not collect tax data and is not designed for 
assessing the effects of the EITC in respondents.  Further, nonparticipants of the EITC 
are likely to be a nonrepresentative and biased group.  As a substitute, Smeeding, Ross, 
O’Connor, and Simon (1999) devised the questions regarding ability to make spending or 
saving decisions if the tax refund was not given.  These are reported on below. 
8. Romich and Weisner (1999) do not have access to tax returns but they estimate that 36 of 
their 42 families are eligible for the EITC.  The larger sample (N=826) and direct 
knowledge of EITC receipt in Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, and Simon (1999) 
complement the analyses of Romich and Weisner (1999) and Rimer (1995).  It is 
encouraging that these findings are generally similar. 
9. Smeeding, Ross, O’Connor, and Simon (1999) rely on the 826 questionnaires filled out at 
the time of the tax filing.  The 208 call-back interviews provided verification of intended 
usage of these refunds.  Call-backs were limited to those with refunds of $1,000 or more 
and we obtained a 50 percent response rate.  About 90 percent of the call-backs received 
the refund amount calculated by the CLHS.  Differences were due to federal inquiries 
regarding legitimacy of the returns, or lower refunds due to school loans or child support 
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payments that were outstanding.  Among this 90 percent there was a high (85 percent) 
correspondence between intended use of refund (sample used here) and actual usage 
(once the check arrived), with no systematic change in the distribution of tax return usage 
by type of use.  Call-back interviewees were remarkably consistent in their preferences 
for EITC usage in the phone interview compared to the face-to-face interview. 
10. Edin (1998) reports that some of the men in her sample purchase trucks to use for 
informal salvage operations for trash dumping (“junkers”) or for local moving, shipping, 
and delivery services. 
11. In fact, in other call-back interviews, we found a small number of EITC returns (less than 
3 percent) which were reduced by the Internal Revenue Service because of money still 
owed on guaranteed student loans.  
12. While 82 percent of the EITC participants in the Beverly, Tescher, and Marzahl (2000) 
study who would have participated in their EITC-savings did not do so, most who did 
were “unbanked.”  It could be that the large number of nonparticipants did not take 
advantage of the EITC savings plan because they realized that it would not be possible to 
tie up their EITC check long enough to collect the up to $100 bonus promised at year’s 
end for participants.  
13. This finding helped inspire the recent Beverly, Tescher, and Marzahl (2000) study.  
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